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Dr. Rainer Geiger*
A. Introduction: Essence and Purpose of Convertibility
The convertibility of currencies has to be seen in close connection with
the promotion of an international division of labour and the liberaliza-
tion of international trade. The world economy is divided into a number
of national economies which are distinguished by their different re-
sources, skills and conditions of production. In the absence of a univer-
sally accepted monetary unit for payment, each country must have its
own currency and monetary system. The functional value of money,
therefore, is originally limited by national borders. If there is no possi-
bility of conversion a specific currency can only be used as a means of
exchange for goods and services within the territory of the issuing coun-
try.
Unless a country chooses to be completely self-sufficient it must ad-
here to some system of international payments. Basically it has two
options: it may bilaterally or multilaterally agree on a clearing system,
or it may convert against other currencies.
Bilateral payment arrangements became widespread in the post-
World War II period and are still of special importance for the trade
relations between western and state trading countries. Until December,
1958, when most of the non-communist European countries accepted
"external convertibility" of their currencies, the European Payments
Union (EPU) provided for a multilateral clearing system. A similar
arrangement still exists within the COMECON. Bilateral and multilat-
eral clearing systems constitute a mechanism by which the partner coun-
tries can effect their reciprocal current settlements with a minimum of
gold or foreign exchange. In a bilateral arrangement the two central
banks open accounts in their respective currencies in each other's name.
All permitted payments are channeled through these accounts and the
remaining balance is settled in foreign exchange from time to time. In
a multilateral system all accounts are in one bank and are settled on
the basis of a common unit of account.'
The second option, convertibility of the country's currency, means the
transformation of home money into foreign money by exchanging the
various currencies against each other at a certain price called the ex-
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change rate.
It is obvious that bilateral and even multilateral payment arrange-
ments, which are essentially discriminatory, seriously hamper interna-
tional trade and international integration. The inconvertibility of cur-
rencies, even in the absence of trade restrictions, is a serious obstacle
to international transactions of goods and services; restrictive trade
policies can make a currency practically inconvertible. In fact, currency
restrictions are often combined with discriminatory trade practices,
import quotas or protective tariff policies.
Two complementary efforts have been made to promote world trade
and international economic integration. The General Agreements on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) seeks to achieve unrestricted multilateral
trade by prohibiting import quotas and discrimination. The Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) has as its basic purpose the promotion of
international monetary cooperation by the establishment of uniform
exchange rates and a multilateral system of convertible currencies.
The establishment of free internationl trade and the complete elimina-
tion of currency restrictions, however, are ideals which can only be
realized gradually. Liberalization may be difficult after periods of isola-
tion, and therefore protection is necessary for periods of adaptation
while restoring the equilibrium of home markets.
The draftsmen of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF were aware
of these difficulties. They found an equitable and viable solution. The
Articles of Agreement demand the complete elimination of currency
restrictions on current transactions but permit a transitional period for
those members which are not yet prepared to face the full obligations
of convertibility.
What are these obligations? How can we define convertibility? At first
sight the definition seems easy: exchangeabilityof currency. But this is
too general to be satisfactory. In fact, there is a large variety of concepts
of convertibility. The opinions differ even as to what should be regarded
as the theoretical maximum. According to Hartung, complete converti-
bility means entire freedom of all trade and currency transactions.' In
the opinion of Joseph Gold, the concept of convertibility is related only
to currency and not to trade. Therefore it should be assessed only on
currency measures.' Consequently Gold believes maximum convertibil-
ity to be the free use and exchangeability of a currency at its par value
or at some fixed rate of exchange without any restriction of currency
character.
'HARTUNG, DIE PROBLEM DER WAEHRUNGSKONVERTIERBARKEIT, at 17 (1959).
'Gold, The Fund's Concepts of Convertibility, 14 IMF PAMPHLET SERIES 2 (1971).
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The recent monetary crisis has shown that even the industrialized and
prosperous western countries are still far away from this minimum
standard. In some countries the stability of exchange rates had to be
sacrificed in order to avoid exchange restrictions, while others adopted
controls on capital transfers or established multiple currency practices
with respect to current and capital transactions. Though the dollar has
been inconvertible into gold since August 15, 1971, it continues to be a
convertible currency for other purposes. In December, 1958, most
European countries had reached external convertibility, i.e., convertibil-
ity for nonresidents, while maintaining some exchange restrictions for
residents.
As we can see, there is no uniform or universally agreed concept or
definition. From inconvertibility to the conceivable theoretical maxi-
mum of convertibility there is a wide range of standards. The concepts
of convertibility vary with its different purposes.4
For this reason many international agreements and other legal instru-
ments referring to "convertibility" avoid a general definition and pro-
vide for ad hoc determination.' It is in the Articles of Agreement of the
IMF that we find a number of legal standards of convertibility which
are not only of particular importance in international public law but
which also have a considerable impact on private business transactions.
B. Legal Aspects of Convertibility in Public International Law.
I. De jure convertibility under Art VIII of the IMF Agreement.
The definition given by Article XIX(d) describes the convertibility
that each member must eventually adopt, thereby accepting the obliga-
tions enumerated in Article VIII Sections 2, 3, and 4.
This definition is significant because of its originality. In contrast with
the great variety of concepts of convertibility mentioned above, Article
XIX does not refer to a factual situation or certain objective elements;
the only decisive criterion is the formally expressed will of a member
to assume a certain legal status. We have to consider the consequences
of this declaration of acceptance in order to know what convertibility,
for the Fund's purposes, really means.
Article VIII is one of the most important provisions of the Articles
of Agreement. It is directly related to the Fund's basic purpose of
41d. at 58.
5See ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION (IDA) art.
12 § 2f; ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK art. 25.
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promoting international monetary cooperation by a multilateral system
of payments. In order to achieve this purpose, Article VIII in section
2(a) generally prohibits the imposition of restrictions on the "making
of payments and transfers for current international transactions" with-
out prior approval of the Fund. To understand this prohibition it is
essential to know what the term "restrictions on current payments"
really means.
Restrictions, as distinguished from controls, are only those measures
which have a real interference with payments and transfers. Government
limitation on, or effective hindrance of, the availability or use of foreign
exchange in connection with international transactions undoubtedly
must be regarded as a restriction. Article VIII section 2(a) on the other
hand, does not prevent a member from using reasonable controls pre-
cedent to payments or transfers, provided that the control procedures
do not unduly delay these operations.' Such controls may be necessary
to segregate capital transfers which under Article VI section 3 are sub-
ject to limitations and restrictions.
Article VIII does not require freedom of capital transfers because the
exercise of that freedom not only produces disequilibrium in a country's
economy, but may also seriously endanger the stability of the interna-
tional monetary system. This was clearly demonstrated recently by the
speculation against the dollar. For this reason the Fund can request a
member to impose capital controls to meet "a large or sustained outflow
of capital" under Article VI section l(a).7 This leads us to the question
of distinguishing current and capital transactions.
The definition of "current" and "capital" is grounded on economic
concepts. The balance of payments generally includes in Group A ex-
ports and imports as shown in external trade statistics, and in Group B
transfer payments, i.e., receipts and payments without a quid pro quo.'
Groups A and B together are sometimes called "the current balance".
This term, however, is not used consistently from country to country.
Some divide transfers in capital and current transfers without being able
to indicate a clear criterion for this distinction.9 The IMF Agreement,
while based on economic distinctions, gives a legal definition which is
'Gold, The IMF and Private Business Transactions, 3 IMF PAMPHLET SERIES 7 (1965).
'In order to determine if there is a large or sustained outflow, the Fund may rely upon the size
and duration compared with previous outflows, the size of the members economy or the size of its
quota. Cf. Evans, Current and Capital Transactions: How the Fund Defines Them, 5 FINANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT 30 (1968).
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shaped after the purpose of the Articles and is not entirely consistent
with views held by economists.
According to Article XIX(i) current transactions include, without
limitation:
(1) All payments due in connection with foreign trade, other current
business, including services and normal short-term banking and credit
facilities
(2) Payments due as interest on loans and as net income from other
investments
(3) Payments of moderate amount for amortization of loans or for
depreciation of direct investments
(4) Moderate remittances for family living expenses.
This definition of "current" includes all payments so defined by eco-
nomic formulas. In addition it includes transfer payments for which no
established rule exists and certain payments which otherwise would be
considered capital from an economic standpoint."0 It has been adopted
to attain certain policy objectives and therefore extends to all payments
which in pursuance of these objectives were to be given the preferential
treatment of Article VIII section 2(a)."
There has been some doubt about the meaning of the term "restric-
tions on payments." Every restriction, even of a trade character such
as import quotas, directly or indirectly affects the freedom of payments.
This doubt has been removed by Executive Decision No. 1034 of June
1, 1960."2 The guiding principle under this decision is whether a restric-
tion involves a direct governmental limitation on the availability or use
of exchange as such. Governmental interventions of a purely trade char-
acter are not within the jurisdiction of the Fund.
The "current account" convertibility established by Article VIII is
not only an external convertibility. By prohibiting restriction on the
making of payments, Article VIII imposes the duty to permit residents
as well as non-residents to get the foreign exchange needed for interna-
tional transactions. 3
The term "making of payments" means that a member may not
restrict outpayments. On the contrary, it is entirely free to impose re-
striction on inpayments.4 Article VIII section 2(a) does not deal with
'"Evans, supra, at 34-35.
"Normal short term banking and credit facilities (Art. XIX(i)]) are necessary to the sustaining
of trade and current business operations. This is the reason why in spite of their capital character
they are deemed current for the purpose of Art. VIII § 2 (a).
I2 MF Exec Dec 1034 (60/27) June I, 1960 Sel. Dec. p. 82.
'
3J. GOLD, supra note 6, at 8-9.
I'D. CARREAU, LE FONDS MONETAIRE INTERNATIONAL at 152 (1970).
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the receipt of currency by residents. The member therefore may pre-
scribe which currency to receive and it may even require the surrender
of foreign exchange earnings by its residents.
In addition to the freedom of outpayments, Article VIII section 2(a)
provides for the freedom of transfer. This means that a non-resident
must be permitted to convert balances accrued from current interna-
tional transactions. These balances, however, must be presented for
conversion or settlements in other transactions within a reasonable
length of time, taking into account business practices in connection with
working balances and repatriation of profits. 5 If balances are held for
a longer period, the presumption may arise that the holder wants to
make an investment. They then can be considered as capital and, in
consequence, are subject to capital controls under Article VI section 3.
Under Article VIII section 3, members are obliged to avoid discrimi-
natory currency practices and to discontinue any such existing arrange-
ments or practices. According to the Fund's jurisdiction, this provision
includes only arrangements which are directly related to currency. 6 Its
purpose is to eliminate bilateral or multilateral clearing systems which,
as mentioned above, may seriously disturb international trade. Multiple
currency practices are regulations which provide different exchange
rates for the currency of a country, depending on the nature of the
transaction involved. When used for balance of payments purposes,
multiple exchange rates have the same effect as import restrictions.
Article VIII section 3 does not explicitly refer to current transactions.
An interpretation by the Executive Directors, however, has made clear
that in accordance with Article VI section 3 members are free to intro-
duce or to maintain capital controls of discriminatory character. 7 The
prohibition of discriminatory arrangements and multiple currency prac-
tices therefore is limited to current payments and transfers.
While section 2(a) of Article VIII requires freedom for parties of
international transactions, whether private or official, to conduct their
current business in the exchange markets of the members, section 4
contains rules for the conversion of balances between monetary authori-
ties of the members. Until now the procedure provided by Article VIII
section 4 has had no practical importance; the markets proved to be the
main mechanism for conversion. Article VIII section 4 means essen-
tially conversion through the Fund, because the converting member
"Evans, supra, at 32.
I1J. GOLD, supra note 6, at 15.
"
7Exec. Dec. No. 541 (56/39) of July 25, 1956, Sel. Dec. at 55.
"There is only one example of an official conversion under Art. Vill § (4); see IMF Press
Release No. 576 (Aug. 18, 1966).
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generally will draw on the Fund to obtain the demanded currency."9 For
this reason there is no obligation to convert official balances if the
converting country is not entitled to purchase from the Fund (Article
VIII section 4 b (v)). Furthermore, conversion under section 4 is limited
to balances obtained from or needed for current transactions. This is
probably the reason why the provision was virtually never applied. Cen-
tral banks, in intervening on the market, do not distinguish between
current or capital balances. So, if the monetary authorities of the coun-
tries whose dollar holdings have been inflated as the result of last year's
or a previous year's monetary crisis were to present some of their dollar
balances for official conversion, the United States could object that they
have not been acquired recently as a result of current transactions. The
actual "dollar problem" therefore can not be resolved on the basis of
Article VIII section 4.
As we have seen, concepts of convertibility defining the theoretical
maximum demand not only complete freedom of payments and trans-
fers, but also stability of exchange rates. Article VIII does not go so
far. It contains no assurance of the exchange rates at which the currency
may be used and converted. So even if a member no longer observes
the exchange rate provisions of Article IV, its currency continues to be
convertible under Article VIII. 0 In fact, some members recently let
their currencies float in order to avoid exchange controls. This had no
influence on convertibility.
The members which accepted the obligations of "current account"
convertibility under Article III can introduce exchange restrictions on
current payments and transfers only under exceptional circumstances.
If the Fund finds that its holding of a member's currency will not
be sufficient to meet the demand, it can formally declare the scarcity
of the currency. Under Article VII (3), after such a declaration any
member is free to impose temporary restrictions on the exchange of the
scarce currency. This provision, originally devised as a means of sharing
the burden of balance of payments adjustments between surplus and
deficit countries, has never been applied."
A member can also introduce exchange restrictions, with the prior
approval of the Fund. The Fund has adopted strict policy guidelines for
such approval. The acceptance of the full obligations of Article VIII is
deemed to be the last and final step towards convertibility. There should
"Gold, supra note 3, at 16.
"Id. at 17.
"For a discussion of the efficiency of the scarce currency provision see Meier, The Bretton
Woods Agreement- Twenty Five Years After, 23 STAN. L. REV. 240 (1971).
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be no retrogression. Under the Executive Decision of June 1, 1960,
approval of restrictions must be based on a close scrutiny of the coun-
try's overall economic position and the possibility of alternative correc-
tive measures, particularly in the monetary and fiscal fields."2
The introduction of exchange restrictions, does not affect the legal
status of the member's currency. Under Article VIII, the currency re-
mains de jure convertible, even if as a consequence of substantial restric-
tions approved by the Fund, it is inconvertible in fact."
De jure convertibility of a currency only means that the issuing mem-
ber has accepted the status of Article VIII, sections 2, 3, and 4. It does
not necessarily mean that this currency is available for international
transactions at some assured exchange rate. There may be a sharp
division between the legal status and the actual situation. The concept
of de jure convertibility has been primarily designed as a standard for
the members' obligations of good monetary conduct, standards of be-
haviour do not necessarily reflect reality. There are however, other
purposes and activities of the Fund which do not permit such a degree
of abstraction from factual elements. For these purposes, the concept
of de jure inconvertibility is insufficient; additional standards had to be
developed particularly in connection with the General Arrangements to
Borrow (GAB) and the establishment of the Special Drawing Rights
(SDR). But let us first consider the concept of "de facto convertibility"
which we can already find in the Articles of Agreement in their original
form.
II. "De Facto" Convertibility
The obligations of Article VIII are binding on all members from the
date that they join the Fund. But these obligations may be modified if
members choose to avail themselves of the transitional arrangements of
Article XIV. The post-war transitional period is not defined as to its
duration. The Fund has no authority to announce generally the end of
this period. 4 The initiative to assume dejure convertibility under Article
VIII rests with the members and the Fund can only make representa-
tions that conditions are favorable to the withdrawal of a particular
restriction or to the general abandonment of all restrictions (Article
XIV section 4).
The acceptance of Article VIII is irrevocable. A decision of this kind
1Supra note 12.
"Gold, supra note 3, at II.
2 M. DE VRIEs, A Convertible Currency World in THE IMF 1945-1965 VOL. I at 280 (1969).
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demands careful deliberation." The prudence of the members has even
been encouraged by the Fund which, in its Executive Decision of June
1, 1960, declared itself particularly reluctant to approve exchange re-
strictions for Article VIII currencies.
It is the practice of the Fund that new members may still choose the
status of Article XIV. They may then maintain or adapt existing ex-
change restrictions. New restrictions, however, as well as any change of
multiple exchange rates, must be approved by the Fund.26 Actually, two-
thirds of the Fund's members, nearly all of which are developing coun-
tries, avail themselves of the transitional advantages of Article XIV.
Their currencies therefore are inconvertible by definition Article
XIX(d), but not necessarily inconvertible in fact. So, if all existing
restrictions are abandoned, a member may take no further action under
Article XIV. Its currency then is "de facto convertible", although it
remains de jure inconvertible until notice of acceptance of Article VIII
has been given. In some cases de facto convertibility may even be
broader if, for a de jure convertible currency, the Fund has approved
restrictions under Article VIII section 2(a).
Some of the members' obligations such as the repurchase of the
currencies from the Fund' and the payment of charges 28 and subscrip-
tions2" depend on the extent and nature of their monetary reserves.
Under Article XIX(g) balances of de jure inconvertible currency may
be deemed convertible for the purpose of calculating monetary reserves
if there is a reasonable factual basis that conversion will be available at
the option of the holder of the currency °.3 The underlying policy of
Article XIX(g) is to recognize the de facto convertibility of certain
currencies and to prevent members from reducing their purchase obliga-
tions under Article V section 7(b) by holding balances which are con-
vertible de facto but not de jure. Until now Article XIX (g) has had no
practical importance for the reason that all members which have an
important role in international trade and strong currencies have estab-
lished convertibility under Article VIII.
De facto convertibility is further recognized by Article XIX (h). Ac-
cording to this provision, for the purpose of calculating a member's gold
"Most Western European countries did not abandon all restrictions on current payments until
the end of 1958 and did not accept the status of de jure convertibility until February 1961.
"
6Gold, supra note 3 at 22; For multiple exchange rates see Exec. Dec No (57/33) June 26, 1957
Sel Dec. at 90.
2 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE IMF art. V § 7 para. b.
"
8ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE IMF art. V § 8 para f.
"ARTICLE OF AGREEMENT OF THE IMF art. IlI § 4 para a.
"Gold, supra note 3, at 26.
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subscription under Article III section 3(b), from its official holdings of
gold or United States dollars may be deducted from the de facto con-
vertible holdings of its own currency by other countries, official institu-
tions or banks.
III. The Concept of "Convertibility in Fact" in the General Arrange-
ments to Borrow
In the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) which became
effective on October 24, 1962, the ten most important western industrial
countries (the Group of Ten) agreed with he Fund to stand ready to lend
their currencies to the Fund when supplementary resources are needed
to meet an impairment of the international monetary system.3 Under
paragraph 11 (a) repayment has to be made in the participant's currency
whenever feasible, or in gold or, after consultation with the participant,
in other currencies that are convertible in fact.
This concept of convertibility was adopted with respect to one partici-
pant (Japan) whose currency was at that time inconvertible under Arti-
cle VIII, but convertible in the market.3 2 Another reason was to give
the participants some insurance that they would be repaid in a currency
meeting their needs. As we have seen, a currency which is de jure con-
vertible may be subject to substantial exchange restrictions and, there-
fore, be inconvertible in fact. The Fund should not repay in a currency
of such character.
In contrast to Article VIII the concept of convertibility in fact, which
has not been defined by the GAB, is exclusively based on objective
elements, in particular the absence of actual exchange restrictions.3 1
A currency that can not be converted is inadequate for repayment and
can be returned to the Fund. Similar to Article VIII, convertibility in
fact includes no element of assured exchange value.34 The participants'
interests, however, are safeguarded because claims of repayment under
the GAB are guaranteed as to value and will generally be discharged
by the Fund at the parity or a representative market rate established at
the time when the loan was made.
IV. Convertibility in Fact in the New System of Special Drawing
Rights
The Special Drawing Rights (SDR), created in 1968 in order to in-
3 Exec Dec. No. 1289 (62/I) Jan 5, 1962, Sel. Dec. at 50.
"Japan accepted the status of Art Vill on April I, 1964.
'The term de facto convertibility was not used in order to avoid the possible misunderstanding
that de jure convertible currencies are per se excluded as a means of repayment.
"
4Gold, supra note 3, at 33.
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crease world liquidity by supplementing the existing reserve assets, rep-
resent the obligation of all participants of the Special Drawing Account
to provide convertible currency. The value of the SDR rests on interna-
tional cooperation, the readiness of virtually all non-communist coun-
tries to accept them in settlement of payment imbalances.
Under the conditions of Article XXV section 2(b) transactions with
SDRs can be freely agreed upon between participants. In the majority
of cases however, they are transferred by the transferor to a transferee
which has been designated by the Fund. The transferee, in exchange, is
not obliged to provide the currency originally wanted; it can discharge
its obligation by any other currency "convertible in fact."
Like in the GAB the term "convertible in fact" has been designed to
make sure that the transferor receives a currency that meets certain
standards of effective convertibility which are not involved in the con-
cept of Article VIII. As an additional element convertibility for the
purpose of the SDRs includes the guarantee of "equal value." As we
have seen, there is no such requirement for repayments under the GAB.
Article XXXII (b) distinguishes two categories of currencies which
are regarded as convertible for the purposes of transactions with SDRs.
There are four elements in the definition of the first category of currency
convertible in fact: de jure convertibility, interconvertibility, equal value
and official conversion.
In view of the other components, dejure convertibility is of no partic-
ular importance for our definition. It has been included primarily for
the purpose of increasing the likelihood that the transferee will be hold-
ing a currency that is convertible in fact and that it will have no diffi-
culty producing such a currency from its reserves.
It is the purpose of interconvertibility to assure that the transferor
gets exactly the currency of the first category it wants even if the trans-
feree provides another currency. The term "interconvertibility" was not
incorporated in the Articles, but it was used in the Report of the Execu-
tive Directors to the Board of Governors on the proposed amend-
ments. 6 It means that a currency of the first category obtained in a
transaction involving SDRs must be convertible into any other currency
of the first category which the transferor of SDRs wants. Before decid-
ing that a currency meets the requirements of convertibility in fact, the
Fund will consult members to determine whether appropriate arrange-
ments have been taken to assure the conversion of that currency into
1Id. at 42.
'Establishment of a Facility Based on Special Drawing Rights in the IMF and Modifications
in the Rules and Practices of the Fund, Washington D.C., (1968) § 24 at 18.
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all other currencies of the first category.3 1
If the transferee provides a currency other than that wanted, the
transferor has to be assured that the issuer will convert it at a rate of
exchange yielding the same amount of that currency; for instance,
should the transferor demand dollars and the transferee provide French
francs, France will convert these balances into dollars. At the moment
of the conversion, however, the exchange rate of the franc may be a
discount on the market within the margins of par or, if fluctuating rates
have been adopted, outside of these margins. In this case the transferor
would not get the same amount of dollars he would have received if the
transferee had provided dollars in the first place.
In order to avoid such differences of treatment and to prevent a
transferee from deliberately providing a currency that is at discount in
the market, the requirement of "equal value" has been included in the
definition of convertibility in fact.38 Article XXV section 8(a) provides
that:
The exchange rates for operations or transactions between participants
shall be such that a participant using SDRs shall receive the same
value, whatever currencies might be provided and whichever partici-
pants provide those currencies, and the Fund shall adopt regulations
to give effect to this principle.
This provision has been made effective by rule 0-3 of the Fund's Rules
and Regulations. Under this rule, the exchange rates applicable to trans-
actions involving SDRs are: par value for the U.S. dollar and for other
currencies the representative rate for spot delivery of the dollar. Where
such a rate can not be easily ascertained, a cross-rate will be calculated
on the basis of representative rates. The requirement of "equal value"
guarantees that the rate for conversion into the currency wanted will be
the rate prevailing at the date of the dispatch of the Fund's instruction
designating a transferee, or where no designation is involved, the date
on which the transferor gives notice to the Fund before the transaction
is carried out.39
The fourth element of the definition, official conversion, does not
necessarily mean that conversion must take place directly between the
monetary authorities of the countries involved in the transaction. Its
only purpose is to give effect to the requirement of "equal value."
Official conversion means that, even if the issue conducts the conversion
37THE INT'L. MONETARY FUND, BY-LAws, RULES AND REGULATIONS, 28th Issue. Oct. 20, 1969,
Rule 0-1.
"Gold, supra note 3, at 48.
' rHE INT'L MONETARY FUND, BY-LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra Rule 0-4.
1974]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
through the market, it remains responsible for seeing that equal value
is provided. Therefore, if the rate of its currency is at a discount on the
day of the conversion compared with the day of the dispatch of the
notification or the designation instruction (Rule 0-4) the issuer must
bear the loss.
Under Article XXXII (b) (2) currencies convertible in fact of the
second category must fulfill two conditions. First, in the opinion of the
Fund, satisfactory arrangements must exist for conversion by the issuer
into at least one currency of the first category. Interconvertibility is not
required. Second, the conversion must satisfy the "equal value" require-
ment under the rules described above.
So far currencies of the first category are the U.S. dollar, the British
pound sterling and the French franc. The currencies of Belgium, Ger-
many, Italy, Netherlands and Mexico have been established as curren-
cies of the second category. Each of these participants has arranged that
any conversion of its currency will be into U.S. dollars but not into the
other two interconvertible currencies.
V. The concept of gold convertibility
In the text of the Fund's Articles of Agreement, gold plays only a
marginal role. Under the convertibility provision of Article VIII the
members are not committed to gold. In reality, however, until the crea-
tion of the SDRs as a supplementary reserve asset, gold has been one
of the pivotal factors of the international monetary system. This is why
President Nixon's decision of August 15, 1971, to suspend the gold
convertibility of the dollar so seriously threatened the stability of the
whole system and so dramatically emphasized the necessity of reforms.
Before we consider the meaning of this decision, let us define the essence
and purpose of gold convertibility.
Under Article IV section 4 (b) exchange transactions must take place
only within certain defined margins from par.40 Without intervening on
the exchange market a member may fulfill its obligation to parity by
freely buying or selling gold. The gold convertibility of Article IV sec-
tion 4(b) includes two elements. First, a member must stand ready to
buy and to sell gold at prices based on the par value of its currency.
Under this condition the other members can obtain for gold the inter-
vention currency they need in order to maintain appropriate margins.
Second, a member must not maintain any restrictions on payments for
current transactions as well as capital transfers. Gold convertibility
'"These margines have been considerably widened by the realignment decision of Dec. 18, 1971.
See INT'L FINANCIAL NEWS SURVEY Vol XXIII No. 50, p. 419 Dec 22-30, 1971.
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therefore is more rigorous than the "current account" convertibility of
Article VIII."
Until August 15, 1971, the role of the dollar as the main reserve
currency was based on the U.S. commitment to gold." Relying on this
commitment the other countries helped to finance a long string of U.S.
deficits by increasing their dollar holdings. As a consequence, the U.S.
did not need to intervene on the exchange markets in order to support
its currency.
Undoubtedly the Executive Decision of August 15 was consistent with
domestic as well as international law. The Gold Reserve Act of 193411
gives the President the power to revoke the commitment to convert
dollars into gold. Under the IMF Agreement members are not legally
bound to sell or buy gold freely and can decide at any time to terminate
this practice."
The present status of dollar inconvertibility is highly unsatisfactory.
The absence of a provision for the settlement of dollar balances unduly
shields the United States from the working of the adjustment process;
its deficit being permanently financed by the accumulation of its incon-
vertible currency abroad. 5 The uncontrolled extension of U.S. dollar
liabilities has proved to be a major cause for world-wide inflation. 6
VI. Convertibility and the Settlement of Imbalances in a Reformed
Monetary System
In order to control liquidity a reformed international monetary sys-
tem has to provide for the settlement of payments imbalances by means
of primary reserve assets or negotiated credit facilities. 7 Two alterna-
tives have been suggested.
The first approach, sponsored mainly by the West European coun-
tries, may be characterized as mandatory convertibility. It means that
countries whose currencies are held in official reserves have to sell pri-
mary reserve assets (mainly SDRs) in exchange for their own currency
to the extent of the increase in aggregate foreign holdings of that cur-
rency. In case of a decrease, they would be entitled to buy SDRs from
a substitution facility to be established in the Fund in exchange for their
"Gold, supra note 3, at 36.
4220 FED. RES. BUL. 69 (1934).
1'31 U.S.C. § 408(a).
"Gold, supra note 3, at 36.
'"See Meier, supra note 21, at 235-261.
'"in the last three years monetary reserves have almost doubled from 75 to 145 billion SDR.
'"See Reform of the International Monetary System, A Report by the Executive Directors to
the Board of Governors, Chapter 111 (1972).
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own currency.
The other alternative, suggested by the United States, allows for
optional asset settlement of imbalances. The reserve center would have
to convert foreign official holdings of its currency only if so requested
by the creditor country. Consequently every member country would
remain free to continue the holding of dollars in its official reserves
without limitation.
During the meeting of the Committee of the Twenty on July 30/31
1973 European and American differences on the issue of convertibility
were considerably narroweds.4 A possible compromise would be the
combination of strict asset settlement among the major countries, which
would participate in a scheme of multicurrency intervention with a less
stringent convertibility system with regard to third countries. 9
C. Legal Aspects of Convertibility in Private International Law
Unlike most other provisions of the Fund's Article of Agreement, the
standards of convertibility in Article VIII have an immediate effect on
private business transactions and private international law.
I. The unenforceability of exchange contracts under Article VIII 2 (b)
As we have seen, members which have accepted the obligations of de
jure convertibility may, in exceptional circumstances and with the
Fund's prior approval, maintain or introduce restrictions on current
payments and transfers. In order to give effect to these restrictions,
Article VIII section 2 (b) provides as follows:
Exchange contract which involve the currency of any member and
which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member
maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unen-
forceable in the territories of any member ....
This provision is consistent with the Fund's standards of convertibil-
ity. In point of fact the obligation of Article VIII, section 2 (b) is closely
related to the basic purpose of the Fund "to promote international
monetary cooperation" (Article I, section (i), and to the realization that
exchange restrictions on capital movements may sometimes be neces-
sary. Therefore, measures to give effect to each other's exchange control
regulations contribute to the objectives of the Agreement.'"
'See THE TIMES (London) August I, 1973.
'See NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, Aug 3, 1973.
"°See ST. D. METZGER, Exchange Controls and Int'l Law in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE (P.O. Proehl ed.) 1959.
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Article VIII section 2 (b) has been applied and interpreted in a large
number of judicial decisions in several countries and is the subject of
an abundant literature." In the scope of the present study we can only
give a summary of the main issues. For this purpose we shall rely on a
recent decision of the German Supreme Federal Court (BGH) which
illustrates these issues particularly well. 2 In July and August 1963 the
plaintiff, a West German company, in performance of a contract con-
cluded in East Berlin delivered to the defendant, a French firm, halves
of pork produced in East Germany, at the price of more than 1/4
million U.S. dollars. Under the French exchange regulations, applicable
at that time, the price for goods from East Germany was not permitted
to be paid directly to a West German vendor but had to be transferred
within a clearing system to a "bilateral Francs" account with an East
German bank. Therefore, after a dollar transfer to the plaintiff and
defendant's bank was fined. At that time defendant still owed plaintiff
a balance of 250,000 dollars. In order to find a solution the parties met
in Geneva in September 1963. There they agreed on the transfer of the
remaining balance in "bilateral Francs" and defendant undertook to
bear any loss on the exchange rate. According to the agreement of the
parties the x value of the "bilateral Francs" was to be realized by means
of a "switch transaction" which resulted in a 7% loss on the exchange
rate amounting to about 60,000 DM. Plaintiff filed suit against defen-
dant in the District Court (Landgericht) of Frankfurt, Germany for
recovery of this amount. Defendant objected that the agreement con-
cluded in Geneva was void because it violated French exchange regula-
tions. At the time of the action, however, the French regulations which
were applicable in 1963 had been repealed.
The District Court entered judgment for the plaintiff, the Court of
Appeals affirmed and the BGH dismissed the appeal. The present case
involves some important issues as to the interpretation of Article VIII
2 (b). The first question is whether the transaction can be regarded as
an "exchange contract."
There are three possible approaches to this problem. Arthur Nuss-
baum has suggested a restrictive interpretation. 4 In his view "exchange
contracts" are only concerned with the handling of international media
"See J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS (1962); T. KERN, DER INTERNATIONALE
NAEHRUNGSFONDS UND DIE BERUECKSICHTIGUNG AUSLAENDISCHEN DEVISENRECHTS (1968); F.
MANN, DER IWF AND DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT, JURISTENZEITUNG (1970) at 709.
"Judgment of Feb. 17, 1971, 55 BGHZ 334.
"The parties had agreed on the applicability of German law and the jurisdiction of the District
Court of Frankfurt, Germany.
"
4A. NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL (1950) at 543.
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of payment as such. This definition excludes all contracts involving
securities or merchandise. It would limit the scope of Article VIII sec-
tion 2 (b) to the point of rendering it almost meaningless. Another view
is to define exchange contracts to include only transactions which pro-
vide for consideration in the form of foreign exchange. This would
exclude the exchange of gold or securities against consideration other
than currency. As Professor Mann pointed out, however, this result
would be contrary to the intention of the Articles."
A majority of authors are of the opinion that the term "exchange
contract" means all contracts which in any way affect a country's ex-
change resources." No other interpretation would achieve the underly-
ing policy of the Articles to prevent prejudicial effects to a member's
reserve position.
The BGH in its decision did not explicitly pass upon this issue. In its
previous decisions, however, it had already adopted the interpretation
outlined under the discussion of the third approach.57
Whether or not an exchange contract adversely affects a country's
reserve position is an economic question and must be decided on the
basis of balance of payments considerations. 8 Undoubtedly, the agree-
ment of the parties in the above case is an exchange contract in the sense
of the governing legal interpretation. At the time of its conclusion it
violated French exchange control regulations. Thus, the BGH had to
pass upon the meaning of unenforceability under Article VIII section 2
(b).
By accepting the Fund's Articles of Agreement as part of their na-
tional law, the members have undertaken to give effect to the exchange
control regulations of other members which are maintained or intro-
duced consistent with the Agreement. A member's courts may not re-
fuse to apply these regulations as being contrary to the public policy of
the forum. Moreover, contracts violating such regulations must be re-
garded as unenforceable even if under the private international law of
the forum the law under which the regulation applies is not the law
which governs the contract or its performance."
As the BGH pointed out in its opinion, contracts which are unenforce-
able under Article VIII section 2 (b) are not void. Unenforceability
means only that the courts will not implement such contracts, i.e., by
decreeing performance or awarding damages.57
'F. MANN, supra note 51, at 381.
"
6See Id. at 381-382; T. KERN, supra note 51, at 60.
"
7See Judgment of Apr. 9, 1962, 21 WM 601 (Wertpapiermitteilungen); Judgment of Mar. 11,
1970, - JZ 727 (Juristenzeitung).
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In our case, at the time of the lawsuit the exchange regulations exist-
ing at the time of the conclusion of the contract had been repealed. The
BGH saw no reason why it shouldn't enforce the contract. As we have
already mentioned, the purpose of Article VIII section 2 (b) is to protect
a member's monetary reserves. In repealing its exchange control regula-
tions the member itself declares that no further protection is needed. In
the opinion of the BGH the time of performance, not the time of the
conclusion of the contract, is decisive for the determination of whether
the contract is unenforceable. This interpretation is consistent with the
objectives of the Articles and should be approved.6
II. Influence of the IMF Agreement on public policy
On the basis of extensive interpretation of the IMF Agreement some
courts have come to the conclusion that, even outside of the scope of
Article VIII section 2 (b), they could not refuse the application of the
exchange control regulations of another member by reason of public
policy if the law of the latter governed the transaction under the private
international law of the forum.
In Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation62 the exchange
regulations of Czechoslovakia were involved. In applying these regula-
tions the New York court based its decision not on Article VIII section
2 (b), but on the membership of the U.S. and Czechoslovakia in the
Fund.63 In Kolovrat v. Oregon, the United States Supreme Court went
even further. In the latter case there was no contract and thus Article
VIII was inapplicable. The Supreme Court stated in its opinion how-
ever, that the adherence of the U.S. to the Fund Agreement had created
a national public policy which could not be set aside by policy considera-
tions of state laws.64 On the other hand, the New York Court of Appeals
refused to enforce Brasilian exchange regulations by awarding damages
for their violation on the basis of a tort action; the U.S. Supreme Court
denied a petition for certiorari. 5
The Fund Agreement cannot be so broadly construed as to require
the general and unlimited application of exchange regulations of other
'IT. KERN, supra note 51, at 60.
"Exec. Dec. No. 446-4, Sel. Dec. at 74.601d. at 73.
6 Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation, 119 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1952).
"in 1952 when the case was decided Czechoslovakia was still a member of the Fund.
1'1Kolovrat v. State of Oregon, 336 U.S. 187 (1961).
6 Banco de Brazil v. Israel Commodity Co., 239 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1965), cert. denied 376 U.S. 906
(I964).
65See T. KERN, supra note 51, at 106-107.
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members if the specific conditions of Article VIII section 2 (b) are not
satisfied.6 It may, however, strongly influence public policy considera-
tions of national courts and, as demonstrated by the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Kolovrat v. Oregon, even be regarded as generating
national public policy.
D. Conclusion
At present, the international monetary system is in a period of transi-
tion. At the end of this process many of its features may be substantially
different from the original system as concevied at Bretton Woods, but
basic obligation to maintain or establish convertibility will remain un-
changed. Whatever the monetary developments or crises of the future
may be, the standards of dejure convertibility under Article VIII belong
to the essentials of international monetary cooperation. Without denial
of the whole system they cannot be abandoned or even substantially
minimized.
New objectives and evolutions in international law and integration
may, however, create additional and even stricter concepts of converti-
bility. In the case of the European Common Market or other economic
communities, new standards of convertibility will be developed in the
course of transition from mere economic integration to a monetary
union.
The SDRs which generated the ingenious concept of convertibility in
fact will have a central role in the reform of the international monetary
system.67 Originally concevied to increase world liquidity through a ra-
tional decision making process, they may replace reserve assets pres-
ently in use.
After President Nixon's decision of August 15, 1971, gold convertibil-
ity is definitely doomed. In the future it is unlikely that any country will
commit itself to gold. An inconvertible dollar, however, is unacceptable
as a reserve currency.
In the discussions of the reform of the international monetary system
a new concept of convertibility is emerging: the settlement of imbalances
by means of a primary reserve assets (SDR's & reserve positions in the
Fund), or negotiated credit facilities. An agreement on this concept
would be a major step toward new stability in international monetary
relations and, at the same time, contribute to an adequate and viable
solution of the dollar problem.
6 See F. Bergsten, The New Economics and U.S. Foreign Policy, 50 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 199-218
(1972).
7Id. at 214.
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